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Note
Anticompetitive Until Proven Innocent: An
Antitrust Proposal To Embargo Covert Patent
Privateering Against Small Businesses
Kyle R. Kroll*
Imagine you are a corporate juggernaut, a titan of industry, a business behemoth, the figurative 800-pound gorilla—the
prospective monopolist, perhaps. For the most part, you dominate your industry in terms of market share, sales, and reputa1
tion. Your success in business has enabled you to spend sizeable amounts of money in research and development (R&D), and
as a result you have an extensive portfolio of patents and other
2
intellectual property.
Business is good, but you are not without faults. New
startups constantly force you to adapt and enhance your products and services, costing you enormous financial resources.
And because you are larger, it usually takes you longer to re3
spond and pivot to counter smaller competitors. New rivals
present a very real danger to your continued dominance. Your
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.B.
2013, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. Thank you to
Professor Thomas Cotter for his guidance while working on this Note. Additional thanks must be given to my friends and family and the wonderful editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their support and feedback. I
am hopeful that federal courts, legislators, or regulators will find this Note in
their research and consider implementing the solution within. Copyright ©
2016 by Kyle R. Kroll.
1. See Microeconomics—Characteristics of Monopolies, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/microeconomics/
characteristics-monopolies.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
2. See Maximilian A. Grant et al., Getting Your House in Order: Patent
Ownership and the Corporate Structure, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.bna.com/patent-ownership-and-the-corporate-structure.
3. Anita Campbell, Are Big Companies Better Innovators than Small
Ones?, OPEN FORUM (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.americanexpress.com/us/
small-business/openforum/articles/are-big-companies-better-innovators-than
-small-ones (“Corporations move at a glacial pace. They may be faster now, but
‘fast’ is still a relative term when you’re talking about multinational firms. . . .
Small companies have the advantage when it comes to innovation.”).
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patents do not perfectly “cover” their inventions, but it may be
plausible to convince a court that your rivals are infringing on
4
at least some aspects. Although patent litigation is expensive,
you have a large war chest, and you know that small companies
5
often crumble under the weight of a patent infringement suit.
But if you sue competitors, that might harm your pristine repu6
tation with consumers, business partners, and regulators. And
it might result in counter-suit.
Your lawyers tell you that in recent decades, a new model
of patent litigation has emerged. Instead of suing infringers in
7
their own names, “practicing” companies are now outsourcing
patent litigation to non-practicing patent assertion entities
8
(PAEs, a name used by the Federal Trade Commission). Outsourcing patent litigation to PAEs is often cheaper, more lucrative, and very effective, but most importantly, PAEs allow practicing companies to secretly manipulate and hinder rivals via
9
patent litigation.
While outsourcing patent litigation to PAEs may be beneficial to a hypothetical large business, experts and policy-makers
are concerned about the negative effects such arrangements
10
may have on competition and consumers. Commentators ar-

4. See, e.g., Todd Hixon, For Most Small Companies Patents Are Just
About Worthless, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
toddhixon/2013/10/04/for-most-small-companies-patents-are-just-about
-worthless (“[F]requently two issued patents arguably describe the same
thing.”). The doctrine of equivalents may provide broader coverage, at least
facially.
5. See infra Part II.A (describing the effects of patent litigation on small
businesses).
6. See infra note 58; see also Michelle Cramer, Being Sued by Big Business Competition, GREATFX PRINTING (Oct. 27, 2015), http://buzz
.greatfxprinting.com/being-sued-by-big-business-competition.htm (describing
one small business entrepreneur’s tactic of using online public relations to “get
the public on his side and put the heat on [his larger competitor]”).
7. Companies that “practice” their patents are those which actually create products and services based on their patented inventions. See Kailash
Choudhary & Priyanka Rastogi, Non Practicing Entities (NPEs) and Their
Impacts, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=2bc351e0-c393-4637-9c38-306ff7713557.
8. See, e.g., Patent Assertion Entities (PAE) Study, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patent-assertion-entities-pae-study (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
9. See infra Part I.B.4.
10. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2129–70 (2013) (examining the economics of
patent assertion by trolls and practicing entities); cf. eBay Inc. v.
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gue that PAE patent litigation stifles investment and innova11
tion. For this reason in particular, policy-makers are wary of
12
PAEs, especially now that PAEs bring over half of all patent
13
lawsuits. News stories and research also confirm that the hy14
pothetical scenario explained above is increasingly a reality.
“Privateering” is a very concerning and increasingly popular PAE arrangement. In privateering, PAEs are directed—or
“privateered”—by “sponsor” companies and used to harass
15
those companies’ rivals and raise rivals’ costs. In its most
primitive form, privateering entails patent litigation brought
by a PAE against tens to hundreds of targeted companies—
usually rivals of the sponsor. When successful, privateering directly benefits the PAE through settlement or damages awards.
But this reward is insignificant in comparison to the indirect
benefits that inure to the sponsor as a result of reduced competition.
16
In recent decades, scholars have criticized PAEs. They
have focused on addressing “patent trolls”—an older and moreMercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 398 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing and criticizing patent trolls).
11. Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by
Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012) (stating
that privateering is a competitive tool); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at
2124; see also Stephen Kiebzak et al., The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity, 45 RES. POL’Y 218, 229
(2016) (stating that over $21 billion in venture capital has been withheld due
to PAE patent litigation).
12. See, e.g., FTC Seeks To Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their
Impact on Innovation, Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 27, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine
-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact.
13. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2123.
14. See Ian D. McClure, From a Patent Market for Lemons to a Marketplace for Patents: Benchmarking IP in Its Evolution to Asset Class Status, 18
CHAP. L. REV. 759, 778 (2015) (listing numerous examples of “creative patent
transactions and privateering deals structured by companies since 2008”); see
also Florian Mueller, Privateering: Let’s Name and Shame Companies That
Feed Patent Trolls—Please Help Complete the List, FOSS PATENTS (May 12,
2015), http://www.fosspatents.com/2015/05/privateering-lets-name-and-shame
.html (listing transfers from Apple, BlackBerry, British Telecom, Ericsson,
Huawei, Nokia, Sony, and Panasonic to patent privateers).
15. See Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect Deployment of
Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 109, 111–14 (2012); Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent
Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2013, at 1.
16. See, e.g., Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 10; see also Thomas H. Chia, Note,
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publicized type of PAE—but have not addressed patent privateering. And those who have addressed patent privateering
have thus far focused only on the legal implications of the acquisition and aggregation of patents by a PAE, but not spon17
sored litigation against targeted rivals. Some scholars assert
that the best way to address PAE patent litigation is to reform
patent law instead of reforming or employing other areas of
18
law, such as antitrust law. However, Congress has been slow
19
to act in addressing defects in patent law, so the development
of other solutions may be necessary to address patent privateering.
Commentators are optimistic that antitrust law can pro20
vide answers. Among the existing commentary, though, scholars have primarily focused on the effects of patent privateering
on business at-large; they have not focused on how small businesses—those most likely to be targets of patent privateer21
ing —are affected. Thus, the existing commentary overlooks
the most pressing patent privateering concerns.
This Note analyzes how current U.S. antitrust law could be
applied to address patent privateering against small businesses. Part I explores the history, logistics, and effects of PAE privateering and reviews relevant patent and antitrust laws. Part
II analyzes attempts to apply antitrust law to patent privateering against large companies and considers similar applications
to patent privateering against small businesses. Part III recommends Congress, regulators, or the courts adopt a rebuttable
Fighting the Smartphone Patent War with RAND-Encumbered Patents, 27
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 209, 213 (2012) (discussing the debate).
17. See Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Patent Assertion Entities, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445 (2014); Justin R. Orr, Note, Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of Antitrust, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 555–68 (2013).
18. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2171–72; Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Antitrust Claims Against Patent Assertion Entities, 5 ANNOTATED
PATENT DIGEST § 34:54.50 (2016); Orr, supra note 17.
19. For example, a bill directed specifically at patent trolls failed to make
it out of committee in 2014. Joe Mullin, How the Patent Trolls Won in Congress, ARS TECHNICA (May 23, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2014/05/how-the-patent-trolls-won-in-congress.
20. See Susan E. Foster, Intellectual Property Antitrust: The Pendulum
Swings, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 93 (2013); Matthew J.
Reilly, Trending Issues in Antitrust Law and Practice Tips on Avoiding and
Responding to Antitrust Investigations, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW, supra, at 79; Orr, supra note 17.
21. See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 461, 464–66 (2014).
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presumption of antitrust liability and explains why other proposals would inadequately address patent privateering. This
solution will counteract the practical difficulties faced by small
businesses when sued by patent privateers and the related anticompetitive market effects.
I. PRIVATEERING, PATENTS, AND ANTITRUST LAW
This Part surveys patent privateering: its history, structure, strategy, effects, and the applicable law. It begins by reviewing relevant U.S. patent law in Section A. Section B then
offers an explanation of how patent privateering is conducted,
along with a discussion of why it is popular and its effects.
Lastly, Section C briefly explains relevant antitrust law.
A. UNITED STATES PATENT LAW
Patent holders have the right to exclude all others from
“making, using, or selling in the United States the invention
22
claimed by the patent for twenty years.” Most scholars agree
that patent rights benefit society at large by incentivizing R&D
23
and invention. Patents do this by enabling patent-holding inventors to recoup costs and profit from invention, encouraging
the sharing of inventions and licensing to others, and reducing
24
wasteful, duplicative R&D. In this way, patent grants are crucial elements in a competitive system because they encourage
25
competition between inventors to create and innovate. In essence, patents form an essential part of the competitive economic landscape in the United States.
26
Patent rights are enforced through litigation, and in the
past decade, patent infringement suits have increased dramati-

22. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2 (2003) [hereinafter
FTC REPORT].
23. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS:
A POPULIST VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1–2 (2008).
24. Id.
25. E.g., William Wynne, Patent Wars, Trolls, and Privateers: Killing Innovation, Death by 1,000 Lawsuits, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2013).
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain . . .
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States . . . . for a term beginning on the date
on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed . . . .”); id. § 271 (defining infringement and
creating a cause of action for infringement).
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27

cally. There are a variety of reasons for this increase, one of
which is product complexity. Advanced tech products rely on
thousands of patents at once; for example, a typical smartphone
28
may involve as many as 250,000 different patents. It is therefore easy for a smartphone manufacturer to infringe on at least
one patent, perhaps inadvertently. Additionally, companies are
constantly developing new patents based on past patented inventions, leading to overlapping patent rights and increasing
29
the likelihood of infringement. This may also be a byproduct of
30
over-issuance of patents.
Some competitors intend to use patent rights competitively
31
and patent litigation as a competitive tactic. This form of
predatory patent litigation is most common in industries built
primarily on intellectual property capital (e.g., high-tech industries), where the innovation is incremental and patents overlap
32
and are interchangeable. Firms engaging in predatory litiga-

27. See Amy G. O’Toole, Recent Governmental Initiatives and Findings
Addressing NPE Litigation—Are There Any Judicial Solutions?, in NONPRACTING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION 2013: PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES 67 (R. David Donoghue ed., 2013). In recent years, patent litigation
has abated, however. Richard Lloyd, The Number of Litigants in US Patent
Suits Drops to Lowest Level Since 2009, IAM (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.iam
-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=7eed4cea-1687-4769-87e3-caee8fcb8c74; see also Wynne, supra note 25, at 1016.
28. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1017–18. Of note, commentators estimate
that patent royalties paid by smartphone manufacturers may exceed $120 for
every device. See Thibault Schrepel, Patent Privateering—Patents as Weapons,
CTR. FOR POL’Y STUDIES (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/
2014/10/28/patent-privateering-patents-as-weapons.
29. The Doctrine of Equivalents is intended to address this problem. Relationship to the Doctrine of Equivalents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2186.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2016).
30. See generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence
from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 676 (2015) (“Our results suggest that the inability of the PTO to finally rid itself of an application biases it
toward granting patents.”).
31. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1571, 1587–88 (2009); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and AntiCompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512 (2003);
Charles Duan, Big Businesses Are Filing Frivolous Patent Lawsuits To Stifle
Innovative Small Competitors, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/realspin/2014/02/24/big-businesses-are-filing-frivolous-patent
-lawsuits-to-stifle-innovative-small-competitors.
32. See Chien, supra note 31, at 1589; see also Ewing, supra note 11, at 30
(stating that privateering is more prevalent in industries where patents are
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tion tactics tend to target “less financially-established defendants” (usually small or new competitors), a combination that
33
epitomizes a David vs. Goliath scenario.
B. PATENT PRIVATEERING: THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE,
HOW, AND WHY
Recall that patent privateering involves concerted activity
34
between a PAE and a sponsor company. This Section explores
the history of patent privateering, PAE activities, the privateering relationship, why privateering is popular, and the general effects of PAE activities.
1. Use of PAEs in Patent Privateering
35

Regulators first recognized PAEs as early as 2003. By
2006, PAEs gained the attention of the Supreme Court, raising
36
their national profile and spurring debate. Since then, the
number of PAEs and suits brought by them has increased dra37
matically. Each branch of the federal government and many
38
state governments are investigating PAE business models.
Nevertheless, most information about PAE ownership and ac39
tivities remains unknown. And the state and federal governments have only attempted to address small parts of the prob40
lem.
interchangeable because this makes it easier for the privateer to assert infringement with some apparent validity).
33. See Chien, supra note 31, at 1592.
34. See supra p. 2168.
35. See FTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 38–39. Scholars suggest that PAEs
first popped up much earlier, though with less prominence. See Tom Ewing &
Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 15–16.
36. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2123; Jon Leibowitz, Chairman,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Patent Assertion Entity Workshop 3 (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_events/patent-assertion-entity-activities-workshop/121210paeworkshop
.pdf.
38. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 66.
39. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 3–4.
40. Efforts so far have mostly addressed patent trolls threatening litigation against thousands of small businesses at once. See FTC Settlement Bars
Patent Assertion Entity from Using Deceptive Tactics, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc
-settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive (stating that the
number of letters sent by the PAE was over 9,000); Pamela M. Prah, State AGs
Target Patent Trolls To Protect Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://

2174

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2167

Many PAEs are sponsored and operate for the benefit of
41
others. Universities, individual inventors, and technology development companies that do not practice their patents may
42
engage in PAE sponsorship to protect their patent rights. But
major Fortune 500 companies and even sovereign nations use
PAEs not only to protect patents and generate royalties from
43
infringers, but also for competitive purposes. For them, the
competitive interests involved in harassing a rival or perceived
44
corporate threat overshadows any economic interests. Their
PAEs litigate hundreds of patent infringement lawsuits against
45
rivals and threats to their own economies. It is thus perhaps
unsurprising that PAEs bring more than 60% of U.S. patent lit46
igation.
The rise in patent privateering, which involves PAEs, has
been controversial because it carries the potential of anticom47
petitive abuse. In particular, regulators worry about PAE inwww.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/25/state-ag-patent-trolls/
3696889.
41. See Ewing, supra note 11.
42. See id. at 6; see also Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent
Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 666–70 (2014) (discussing the
different kinds of patent holding companies); Ewing, supra note 11, at 25 (discussing the same); David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate
America, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/
business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alert-to-corporate-america.html.
43. Ewing, supra note 11, at 3, 30–31; Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35,
at 6; Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER, July 30, 2001, at 3–6, https://perma-archives.org/ware/XPX8
-JU9T/id_/file:/XPX8-JU9T/cap.pdf; Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, What the U.S. Can
Learn from the EU’s Patent Mistakes, FORBES (June 8, 2015), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/06/08/what-the-u-s-can-learn-from-the-eus
-patent-mistakes; Jeff J. Roberts, Google and Microsoft’s Patent Peace: 3 Unresolved Questions, FORTUNE (Oct. 1, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/01/
google-microsoft-patent-analysis.
44. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 6.
45. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S.
INNOVATION 1 (2013), http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo37258/patent-report
.pdf (reporting that PAEs threatened over 100,000 companies in 2012 and that
the number is rising); Colleen Chien, Presentation in the Patent Entity Activities Workshop (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/pae.
46. Leslie A. Gordon, “Patent Privateers” Do Legal Legwork for Big-Time
Tech Companies, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/
mag_article/small_companies_pick_up_the_cost_of_patent_privateering_
litigation. This number continues to rise. See Stefani E. Shanberg & Joshua A.
Baskin, NPEs in the ITC, in NON-PRACTICING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION
2013, supra note 27, at 51; Chien, supra note 45; Stephanie Mlot, Google Program Fights Patent Trolls, Aids Start-ups, PCMAG (July 24, 2015), http://
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2488392,00.asp (reporting 68%).
47. See Gordon, supra note 46.

2016]

COVERT PATENT PRIVATEERING

2175

volvement in the healthcare and technology industries because
these sectors are economically substantial, implicate many patent rights, and have historically “been subject to a great deal
of antitrust enforcement activity due to . . . alleged use of pa48
tents to exclude or limit competition.” Yet, no federal agency
has taken any steps to break the swell.
2. Privateering’s Core Activities: Aggregation and Litigation
Privateering comprises two core activities: the aggregation
and litigation of patents. Aggregation is the amassing of “vast
49
treasuries of patents” and forming a patent arsenal. The aggregation of thousands of patents shifts the focus from the value of one patent to the size and diversity of a portfolio, which
can be wielded like a club and pose a substantial threat to litigation targets facing hundreds of infringement allegations at
50
once from a single PAE. But this is not to say that the patents
51
held by mass aggregators are always weak; some are strong,
making the threat of the club more intimidating and the seri52
ousness of the suit hard to predict. This club can be “life
threatening” when brandished against startups and small com53
panies.
The relative threat of a patent infringement lawsuit de54
pends on the size of the PAE’s patent arsenal. A larger patent
arsenal enables a PAE to assert more infringement claims
against a single target or against multiple targets and do so
55
more credibly. Either approach often results in nudging rivals
56
into less favorable competitive positions because the high cost

48. Reilly, supra note 20, at 85.
49. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 1.
50. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2153; Orr, supra note 17, at
538.
51. See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 681 (2011).
52. See David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 51, 58 (2014).
53. See id. (stating that “mass patent aggregators may be vehicles that
favor established players over upstarts”).
54. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 11, at 34–35; Wynne, supra note 25, at
1024–25.
55. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra
note 16, at 18.
56. Ewing, supra note 11. A less favorable position may mean market exclusion or increased costs through payment of settlement royalties, making
the targets less competitive. Id.
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of defending a suit incentivizes settlement or exit from the in57
dustry.
Both litigation and aggregation have been wildly successful
strategies for sponsor companies, padding the bottom line with
additional revenue, while eliminating other patent litigation
risks such as infringement counter-suits (since the PAE does
not practice any patents) and reputation costs (with customers,
58
shareholders, partners, or standard-setting entities). Secrecy
59
also eliminates the risk of responses by regulators. Since there
are very few consequences, more and more large companies
have seen patent privateering as a way to generate new and
additional revenue or gain competitive benefits in the wake of
60
the 2008 Great Recession. As a result, these activities are in61
creasing in volume, frequency, and aggressiveness.
3. How Sponsor Companies Structure a Privateering
Relationship
There are at least three common types of patent privateering relationships. Public disclosure is a sponsor’s greatest potential liability, so any privateering arrangement must be
62
stealthy. Secrecy limits a rival’s ability to retaliate against the
57. See Brief of Public Knowledge & the Electronic Frontier Foundation as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 17, Altera Corp. v. Papst Licensing
GmbH & Co. KG, Nos. 15-1914, 15-1919 (Fed. Cir. 2015), https://www
.eff.org/files/2015/12/21/brief-altera-v-papst.pdf (“[Small companies] are . . . the
ones most likely to succumb to undue settlement pressure . . . .”). Note also
that the average cost of patent litigation involving a PAE is about $980,000
through the end of discovery and $1.75 million or more through trial. R. David
Donoghue et al., Fighting Smarter Against NPEs, in NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES PATENT LITIGATION 2013, supra note 27, at 202; see also Wynne, supra
note 25, at 1022.
58. See, e.g., Anti-Competitive Effects: Litigation & Extortion, PATENT
PROGRESS, http://www.patentprogress.org/systemic-problems/anticompetitive
-effects-litigation-extortion (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Jason Rantanen, Guest
Post on Using the Antitrust Laws To Police Patent Privateering, PATENTLY-O
(June 3, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/guest-post-on-using-the
-antitrust-laws-to-police-patent-privateering.html; see also Popofsky &
Laufert, supra note 15, at 4.
59. For example, the Department of Justice would not be able to discern a
pattern of predatory litigation by a market leader and bring criminal charges
under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
60. See McClure, supra note 14.
61. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 53; The Patent Troll Problem, LOT
NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/the-patent-troll-problem (last visited Apr. 4,
2016).
62. Cf. Ewing, supra note 11, at 6 (explaining that “a sponsor’s goals for a
privateering operation are often defeated by public exposure” and that
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sponsor with counterclaims for patent infringement or antitrust violations, harm the sponsor’s reputation, complain to
regulators about a larger competitor’s predatory conduct, or re63
spond to lawsuits in a more calculated way.
First, a sponsor company may license one of its patents to a
64
PAE. Through the licensing agreement, the PAE is granted
the exclusive right to assert the patent against infringers and
litigate the patent in court. The licensing agreement may also
provide the sponsor with some control over the PAE’s patent in65
fringement lawsuits. But unlike other relationships, here
66
sponsor secrecy can be disclosed via discovery. In some cases,
67
licensing may also limit a PAE’s standing to bring suit.
Second, a sponsor company may contract with a PAE in the
hopes of compelling the PAE to use its own patents to sue the
68
69
sponsor’s rivals. A sponsor could also invest in the PAE. In
such cases, the sponsor may be able to obtain greater secrecy
since no patent assertion contract would exist, and the sponsor
70
would exercise control over the PAE as a private part-owner.
Third, and the most likely, the sponsor company could assign its patents to a PAE, but retain a license for practicing the
71
patent. The assignor-sponsor could also contract for the ability
72
to direct assertions against rivals or hold ownership in the
73
PAE. Because patent assignments are not required to be recorded, the secrecy of a privateering arrangement can be main“[c]onsequently, the sponsor typically makes every effort to hide its involvement in a privateering option”).
63. Id. at 9.
64. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2139 (“[C]ompanies rarely
sell their ‘crown jewels’—patents that they need to prevent copying of technologies they consider critical . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., Wynne, supra note 25, at 1026. The license may instead
simply provide guiding principles for how to choose a litigation target. See
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2138.
66. See Alan Devlin, Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation, 67
FLA. L. REV. 775, 835 (2015); Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 460.
67. See Max Grant & Kieran Dickinson, Cases on Standing Hold Lessons
for Patent Privateers and Defendants, MANAGING IP, Oct. 2013, at 22,
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/standing-lessons-for-privateers-and
-defendants.
68. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 5–6, 33.
69. Id. at 73.
70. See id.; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2138.
71. See Orr, supra note 17, at 541.
72. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra
note 16, at 20.
73. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 5–6.
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74

tained. While this arrangement may provide the sponsor with
significant control, secrecy could be compromised if the corpo75
rate veil is pierced. Evidence suggests this arrangement is
76
most common.
Due to the desire for secrecy, either the second or third
type of relationship is both popular and effective in securing
the anticompetitive effects of patent privateering.
4. Privateering’s Advantages for Sponsors and Negative
Effects for Everyone Else
The significant incentives for sponsors to engage in privateering have undoubtedly propelled privateering’s growth in recent years. Privateering offers litigation cost savings to spon77
sors, may result in the receipt of larger settlements and
78
judgment awards, and enables the sponsor company to focus
79
on its actual business. Beyond financial benefits, patent privateering also reduces reputational losses and other consequences
80
from suing competitors, allows sponsors to secretly bombard
74. See, e.g., Susan G.L. Glovsky, Guest Post: It’s Time for a Reliable System To Determine Who Owns a U.S. Patent, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/patent-recordation.html (remarking that
“defendants in a lawsuit may have to take it on faith that the seller, licensor,
borrower, or plaintiff truly owns” the patent-in-suit). When patent assignments are recorded, they can be viewed online. See Assignment Search, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://assignment.uspto.gov (last visited Apr.
4, 2016).
75. See Gordon, supra note 46. However, PAEs can create shell companies
to create further layers of secrecy to slim the risks of piercing. See Wynne, supra note 25, at 1032–33; see also David Balto & Matthew Lane, Abstract for
The Patent Privateering Iceberg (Feb. 7–8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://law.scu.edu/hightech/wipip2014 (“NPEs often employ a complicated
ownership structure consistent of many shell companies to hide patent ownership.”).
76. “Sales to PAEs and other non-practicing entities represent 75 per cent
of all patent transactions.” Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 2.
77. See id. at 4; cf. PATENT LITIGATION: LITIGATING AGAINST A NONPRACTICING ENTITY, PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE 5-553-7946 (2016) [hereinafter PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE] (stating that PAEs often sue using largely the same counsel, experts, and evidence); Economists’ Roundtable
on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16, at 19; Chien, supra note
45 (stating that most PAEs litigate on contingency and have attorneys wellversed in patent litigation).
78. See PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 77.
79. Orr, supra note 17, at 541; see Gordon, supra note 46 (stating that few
companies can successfully manage commercializing patents and running
their core business operations).
80. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra
note 16, at 19; see Ewing, supra note 11, at 6–7; Schwartz, supra note 52, at
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82

rivals, helps achieve competitive results, and reduces the
risk of antitrust violations (due to the secrecy of the sponsor’s
83
identity). It also allows large competitors to “control the location the case will be heard” as well as to gain various jurisdic84
tional advantages.
Privateering has also thrived in the current patent environment, which entails the under-utilization and under85
capitalization of patents, a proliferation of weak and overly86
broad patents, increased outsourcing of functions by corporate
87
88
America, high patent litigation costs, the ability to easily engage in opportunistic litigation and secure favorable settle89
ments, a large patent marketplace for purchasing patent
90
rights, legal uncertainty regarding the merit of infringement
91
accusations, and prohibitive costs in amassing large, defensive
92
patent arsenals.

53; Wynne, supra note 25, at 1021.
81. See generally Ewing, supra note 11 (discussing how sponsors use
PAEs to stifle competitors).
82. Id. at 31, 46 (stating that PAEs can more credibly threaten to sue for
patent infringement); see Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2139–46.
83. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1032–33.
84. See Brief of Public Knowledge & the Electronic Frontier Foundation as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 57, at 15–18.
85. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra
note 16, at 11; Steven Seidenberg, Should Your Company Enlist Patent Privateers?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/
02/26/should-your-company-enlist-patent-privateers.
86. MATSUURA, supra note 23, at 23; see Economists’ Roundtable on Hot
Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16.
87. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 14; see also Lemley & Melamed, supra
note 10, at 2165–66 (stating that there is an “everyone does it” attitude with
privateering); Seidenberg, supra note 85.
88. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 31, at 1584; Seidenberg, supra note 85.
89. See John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 590–91 (2013).
90. Meurer, supra note 31, at 519–20.
91. See, e.g., Florian Mueller, Nokia and Ericsson Seek To Justify Their
Privateering Ways, Defend Patent Transfers to NPEs, FOSS PATENTS (May 21,
2005), http://fosspatents.com/2015/05/nokia-and-ericsson-seek-to-justify.html
(“Smartphone patent assertions are so vastly unsuccessful that I’ve arrived at
the conclusion that the term ‘intellectual property’ is a propagandistic misnomer . . . . [W]hen the vast majority of assertions turn out meritless . . . transaction costs are totally out of proportion . . . .”).
92. See, e.g., Schrepel, supra note 28 (discussing briefly the mutually assured destruction theory of patent ownership); see also Chien, supra note 31,
at 1584–85 (discussing the complications, risks, and expenses of patent litigation between large companies).

2180

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2167

Nevertheless, privateering may face some disadvantages.
For example, judges and juries tend to view PAE claims un93
sympathetically. Further, the possibility of obtaining an injunction against a target is smaller since PAEs do not practice
94
the patents-in-suit. A PAE also cannot obtain damages for lost
95
profits that the sponsoring company might otherwise collect.
However, since privateering is not primarily purposed on collecting royalties or enjoining alleged infringement, experts predict privateering will become even more widespread in the fu96
ture. And it is not so much the likelihood of success on the
merits, but instead the high likelihood of forcing a defendant to
97
settle out of court that enables this litigation model.
Most criticisms of patent privateering relate to the effect
patent privateering has on other actors in the patent system.
For example, patent privateering interferes with innovation by
98
increasing litigation costs to inventors, forcing competitors to
99
withdraw from the market, facilitating bully-like behavior
100
among actors in the patent system, taxing “business, invest101
ment, growth and opportunity,” and encouraging settlement

93. PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 77.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Seidenberg, supra note 85 (“It lowers companies’ risk and puts the
burden of enforcement on others. I don’t see why this [trend] would stop.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matthew Rappaport, managing director of patent analytics company IP Checkups)).
97. See infra Part II.A.
98. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10; Lemley &
Melamed, supra note 10, at 2118; Wynne, supra note 25, at 1009.
99. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1032. Startups may be forced to quit quickly
after they begin. David Goldman, Patent Troll: “I’m Ethical and Moral,” CNN
MONEY (July 2, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/02/technology/enterprise/
patent-troll; Gordon, supra note 46.
100. Schwartz, supra note 52, at 64.
101. Demand Letters and Consumer Protection: Examining Deceptive Practices by Patent Assertion Entities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.,
113th Cong. 11 (2013) (statement of Jon Potter, President, Application Developers Alliance), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg86955.pdf [hereinafter Demand Letters—Senate]; see EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 45, at 9; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2119; Meurer, supra note
31, at 519; see also JORGE LEMUS & EMIL TEMNYALOV, OUTSOURCING PATENT
ENFORCEMENT: THE EFFECT OF “PATENT PRIVATEERS” ON LITIGATION AND
R&D INVESTMENTS 37 (2014), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/
download.cgi?db_name=llOC2015&paper_id=134 (discussing how PAE activity
disincentivizes investment in research and development).
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102

of meritless patent claims. On the competitive and economic
end, patent privateering unfairly harms rivals by scaring off
103
customers and suppliers with threats of litigation, removing
104
high transaction costs that discourage nuisance litigation,
engendering a norm of businesses suing each other indirectly
105
and the formation of invest-to-sue entities, enabling a com106
petitor to indirectly affect a rival’s valuation, reducing incentives for competitors to engage in cross-licensing truces (which
107
108
are socially efficient), raising rivals’ costs, and providing a
method for companies involved in standard-setting to potentially evade fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) li109
censing commitments. Patent privateering reportedly costs
the U.S. economy around $29 billion each year, the costs of
110
which often “falls squarely on the shoulders of the consumer.”
5. Proposals To Address Privateering
Given the general effects of patent privateering noted
111
above, policy-makers have called for legal reforms. Most have
proposed rules designed to lift the veil concealing the identity of
102. Donoghue et al., supra note 57, at 201; Wynne, supra note 25, at 1022
(citations omitted); see also The Patent Troll Problem, supra note 61 (stating
that fewer than 1% of suits are found to have infringed a valid patent).
103. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1032. Demand letters are even being sent to
frighten consumers. See Demand Letters—Senate, supra note 101, at 2–3
(statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill, Chairman).
104. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 23.
105. Gordon, supra note 46.
106. Id.
107. IAIN M. COCKBURN, PRESENTATION ON PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES
POTENTIAL COSTS AT THE FTC/DOJ WORKSHOP 6 (Dec. 10, 2012), http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/patent-assertion
-entity-activities-workshop/icockburn.pdf; LEMUS & TEMNYALOV, supra note
101.
108. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 456–57.
109. See id.; Schrepel, supra note 28 (“[Evading FRAND commitments] is
one of the most harmful side effects of patent privateering.”).
110. Keith Farrell, The Harmful Practice of Patent Privateering,
TOWNHALL (Oct. 20, 2014), http://townhall.com/columnists/keithfarrell/2014/
10/20/the-harmful-practice-of-patent-privateering-n1906666/page/full. Other
sources corroborate costs in the $20–30 billion range. Some, however, put the
number around $15 billion. See LAUREN COHEN ET AL., EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON THE BEHAVIOR AND IMPACT OF PATENT TROLLS: A SURVEY 20–21 (2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2708224. Regardless, the
costs are substantial and increasing over time.
111. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 68. See generally Golden, supra note 89,
at 600–17 (discussing a variety of suggestions for how to reduce the harmful
effects of patent privateering).
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the sponsor company. For example, one proposal argues for a
rule requiring all parties to a lawsuit to list all persons with an
112
interest in the outcome of a case. Other ideas increase sanctions or provide fee-shifting for unjustified, vexatious, or bad
113
Some proposals suggest amending patent
faith litigation.
laws to require notice to the United States Patent and Trade114
mark Office (USPTO) of any assignment or sale of patents
115
and increase the plaintiff’s burden to show infringement.
Lastly, some argue for outlawing patent privateering altogeth116
er—a perhaps unrealistic goal.
Most recently, the private sector has attempted to address
patent privateering by providing startups with patent rights
free of charge in an effort to bring them within Google’s realm
117
of litigation protection. Google has also engaged in several
large cross-licensing deals with other major technology companies as a preemptive measure to protect itself from patent pri118
vateering at the hands of its peers. However, Google’s program is unlikely to solve the patent privateering problem
119
generally. Finally, some commentators have expressed optimism that antitrust law counterclaims or defenses are availa112. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 120–21; O’Toole, supra note 27, at 70–72
(citing H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. and S. 1013, 113th Cong.) (discussing the
America Invents Act).
113. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 123; see also O’Toole, supra note 27, at
68–71 (citing, inter alia, H.R. 845, 113th Cong.) (discussing the America Invents Act and SHIELD Act).
114. O’Toole, supra note 27, at 70 (citing H.R. 2024, 113th Cong.).
115. See Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues,
supra note 16, at 18.
116. See Golden, supra note 89, at 602. Banning privateering might be effective: an international ban on privateering was a major reason why the practice eventually died out on the high seas. See JANE MARTIN LEMNITZER, POWER, LAW AND THE END OF PRIVATEERING 174–75 (2014) (discussing the
abolition of maritime privateering via the Declaration of Paris). But see Star
Trek: Deep Space Nine: To the Death (Paramount television broadcast May 13,
1996) (predicting the use of privateering on the final frontier: space).
117. Mlot, supra note 46.
118. Id.; see also Rubin Sfadj, How Patent Privateering Is Hurting the Patent System and the Innovation Economy, CAPX (July 10, 2015), http://
www.capx.co/how-patent-privateering-is-hurting-the-patent-system-and-the
-innovation-economy. However, Google has also been the target of a patent
privateer called “Rockstar Consortium” sponsored by Apple, Microsoft, RIM,
Sony, Ericsson, and EMC. James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 756 (2015).
119. See generally Rice, supra note 118, at 773–74 (exploring defensive tactics that may be used in the future, but stating that “[n]o single private action
will cure the current patent system”).
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ble to prevent and deter patent privateering. Scholars have
considered whether antitrust law is applicable, with varying
121
opinions.
C. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
United States antitrust law exhibits the fundamental belief that free enterprise, open markets, and competition achieve
122
an optimal economic system. The Sherman Act buttresses
this belief not only by imposing criminal liability on violators,
123
but also providing for treble damages. It also seeks to promote and protect competition by ensuring the process of compe124
tition remains fair.
Antitrust law does not protect competitors from other competitors. Rather, it prohibits competitor conduct that unjustifi125
ably forecloses competition and harms consumers. Because
patent rights allow patent holders to exclude others from creating products based on a patented invention, the antitrust laws
arguably conflict with the grants of power created by patent
126
laws. Thus, policy-makers must determine the best balance
between spurring innovation and protecting competition,
127
though both can sometimes be achieved independently. With
the onset of patent privateering, scholars have turned their attention to evaluating whether or not competitors may legally
use patent litigation to exclude rivals from participation in the
128
market.
120. Foster, supra note 20; Reilly, supra note 20; Orr, supra note 17.
121. E.g., Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17; infra notes 215–16.
122. FTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 1; see Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and
Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299,
310 (2014).
123. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating that any person violating the
section is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine not exceeding $100,000,000, if
a corporation).
124. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.2 (2d
ed. 2012).
125. See id.
126. See Lim, supra note 122. But see David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 396
(2003) (stating that patent and antitrust laws are complementary).
127. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 412; Economists’ Roundtable
on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16, at 19; see also In re
Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust
laws.”).
128. See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 31, at 521.
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There are several antitrust counterclaims and defenses
that a targeted small business could assert in response to a suit
129
by a patent privateer. The following subsections review possible relevant antitrust claims and defenses.
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
130
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” Section 1
exclusively concerns collective, concerted conduct and addresses both horizontal (between competitors) and vertical (supply
131
chain) arrangements. Section 1 only applies to agreements
between independent entities, so parent companies are not liable under the act for arrangements with wholly-owned subsidi132
aries or those partially-owned, over which they have control.
Courts apply either a per se or rule of reason test for Sec133
tion 1 liability. Per se tests are only used when the agreements in question are obviously anticompetitive, such as price134
fixing agreements. Conduct that is not per se illegal is evaluated using the rule of reason test, which essentially requires
the court to determine whether the conduct is more anticompet135
itive than pro-competitive. Courts primarily consider whether
the conduct forecloses on competition or harms consumers—an
136
interrelated analysis.
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
The second Section of the Sherman Antitrust Act states
that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce” is guilty
129. See Carl W. Schwarz et al., The Intellectual Property/Antitrust Interface, 7 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 15 (2000).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
131. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 399; Josh Baskin, Competitive
Regulation of Mobile Software Systems: Promoting Innovation Through Reform of Antitrust and Patent Laws, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1727, 1733 (2013).
132. See CHRISTOPHER J. MACAVOY, US ANTITRUST LAWS: OVERVIEW,
PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE 9-204-0472 (2014).
133. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 399.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: When Is the Rule
of Reason Not the Rule of Reason?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 43–44 (2013)
(discussing the intricacy of the test).
136. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 437.
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of anticompetitive behavior. A company violates Section 2 if it
attempts to acquire monopoly power in its market or willfully
138
maintains its power in anticompetitive ways. Monopoly power is the ability “to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive
139
advantage, or to destroy a competitor.” It can be shown when
a company has the ability to directly affect rivals or has a mar140
ket share of at least 50%. Section 2 applies to both collective
141
conduct and unilateral conduct.
Section 2 claims are somewhat unpredictable, as the law is
142
“more than a little confused.” Generally speaking, there are
two elements to a monopolization claim: (1) possession or attempted possession of monopoly power in the relevant market;
and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power
through anticompetitive conduct, distinguishable from mere
“growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
143
business acumen, or historic accident.” Courts look to whether there exists a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
144
power in attempted monopolization cases.
The Supreme Court has stated that predatory litigation
and associated conduct “may be sufficient to prove the neces145
sary intent” for Section 2 claims. Exclusionary and predatory
146
conduct in general can satisfy intent as well. This includes
abuse of process, espionage or sabotage, patent abuses, and

137. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETIMONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
ACT (2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm
(reflecting the DOJ’s enforcement policy under Section 2 and synthesizing the
views expressed at the DOJ and FTC hearings, in extensive scholarly commentary, and in the jurisprudence relating to unilateral conduct under Section
2).
138. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); Baskin,
supra note 131.
139. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 401.
140. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., 501 F2d 80,
82 (5th Cir. 1974); Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 401.
142. Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What Constitutes “Attempt To Monopolize,” Within Meaning of § 2 of Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2), 27 A.L.R. FED.
762 (2015).
143. See, e.g., Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71.
144. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993);
accord Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
145. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459.
146. See Chia, supra note 16, at 228.
TION AND
SHERMAN
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147

vexatious or repetitive litigation. Meritless patent litigation
exhibits the requisite conduct and intent to unlawfully attempt
148
to monopolize. Outsourcing patent litigation in an effort to
149
maintain or obtain monopoly power may even be sufficient.
In attempts to monopolize, establishing a dangerous probability of success often requires an analysis of the party’s likelihood of achieving monopoly power in a relevant market, in
view of the party’s current market share and the barriers to
150
achieving monopoly power. Merely holding a patent does not
usually convey a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
151
power. Additionally, highly competitive markets with low
market shares and low barriers to entry “do not attract much
152
antitrust concern.” Less competitive, highly centralized mar153
kets with high barriers to entry have more antitrust risk.
3. Handgards Sham Litigation
Patent holders are generally immune from antitrust liability unless they engage in meritless sham litigation or use a patent in some way to extend market power beyond the power
154
granted by the patent. This exception is called Handgards
sham litigation and is one of a handful of specific applications
155
of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Under Noerr-Pennington immunity, all persons have a
right to petition the government for grievances under the First
Amendment, and this has been interpreted to apply to law147. MACAVOY, supra note 132; Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker,
Attempted Monopolization: Reuniting a Doctrine Divorced from Its Criminal
Law Roots and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 355, 360–61
(1990); Schwarz et al., supra note 129; Chia, supra note 16.
148. Ewing, supra note 15, at 139; see infra Part I.C.3.
149. See Ram Menon & Kevin Spivak, Trends in Mobile and Consumer
Electronics, 48 LES NOUVELLES 238, 239 (2013).
150. See David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and ShamLitigation Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 102 (2001).
151. See id.
152. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 403–04.
153. See id.
154. Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 150, at 105.
155. See Baskin, supra note 131, at 1743. There are also other specific
types of Section 2 claims, such as Walker Process claims. See generally Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 150 (outlining the elements of Walker Process,
Handgards or sham-litigation claims and explaining the grounds on which
these claims may be attacked in motions to dismiss and/or at the summary
judgment stage). However, these claims are not applicable unless the patents
involved are invalid due to fraud. Id.
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suits. However, no person may petition the government in
meritless ways as a strategy to harm competitors and consum157
ers. Handgards claims reflect the understanding that patent
holders may not use litigation as an illegitimate weapon in a
158
concealed attempt to interfere with a competitor. This doctrine also establishes, however, that in order for a lawsuit to
violate the antitrust laws, it must be a complete sham, focused
not on the outcome of the case, but instead on the anticompetitive results of the judicial process.
4. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act outlaws acquisitions of assets
(such as patents) where the effect of such transactions “may be
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a mo159
nopoly in a relevant market.” This can be shown when acquisition of patents allows the acquirer to exert monopoly power
(similar to that defined in Section 2 claims) and substantially
160
lessens competition within a relevant market.
5. The Affirmative Defense of Patent Misuse
Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a patent in161
fringement suit. The doctrine states that patent rights are
162
privileges, not unconditional rights, which are abused when
used to extend the patent’s exclusionary power beyond the
163
scope of protection that is reasonably granted by the patent.
A defendant must prove that conduct not only extended the
privilege beyond the scope of the patent, but also caused anti164
competitive injury. This injury can be shown by proving the
patent was used in a way that violates antitrust laws or that
the patent holder has engaged in some element of anticompeti156. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 138–40 (1961); Ewing, supra note 15, at 139; Roszkowski & Brubaker,
supra note 147, at 416.
157. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380
(1991); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979).
158. Schwarz et al., supra note 129.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2014).
160. See John “Jay” Jurata, Jr. & Amisha R. Patel, Taming the Trolls: Why
Antitrust Is Not a Viable Solution for Stopping Patent Assertion Entities, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2014).
161. Lim, supra note 122, at 308; O’Toole, supra note 27, at 79–80.
162. See Lim, supra note 122, at 318–19.
163. See Schwarz et al., supra note 129.
164. See id.
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tive behavior, using its market power to force parties to act in
165
ways they would not otherwise act in a competitive market.
Since it is a defense, patent misuse does not necessarily
166
confer on the defendant a right to recover attorney’s fees. It
does not even invalidate the offending patents—the misused
patents are only unenforceable until the patent holder cures
167
the misuse. Some have argued for a broader and “more robust” patent misuse doctrine that could invalidate patents fully
168
in cases of clear antitrust wrongs. However, other scholars
have argued that patent misuse duplicates antitrust laws and
169
has a weak foundational justification.
II. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO PATENT
PRIVATEERING
This Part adds depth to the discussions of other commentators, who have previously addressed the general, broad effects
of patent privateering, by specifically focusing on patent privateering against small businesses. Section A analyzes how patent privateering affects small businesses, as opposed to large
companies. Section B compares arguments put forth by other
commentators on how to apply antitrust law to patent privateering, exposing analytical holes and adding discussion for patent privateering against small businesses.
A. THE EXACERBATED EFFECTS OF PATENT PRIVATEERING ON
SMALL BUSINESSES
Many of the anticompetitive effects associated with patent
170
privateering apply with greater force to small businesses and
171
small business rivals—the most common PAE target. This is
primarily because small (and often new) businesses are the
165. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1351–52 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1184–86
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d
1341, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 546 U.S. 394 (2006); O’Toole, supra note 27,
at 80–81.
166. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 79–80.
167. Lim, supra note 122, at 309.
168. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 89, at 611.
169. See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 457, 488 (2011).
170. See supra Part I.B.5.
171. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10. But see Chien,
supra note 31, at 1601 (showing that PAEs target the largest companies 40%,
and new startups about 25%, of the time).
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least likely to challenge patent infringement lawsuits brought
172
by PAEs. Since entrepreneurs lack the time, resources, and
sometimes even mental fortitude to address such lawsuits, they
173
often are forced to settle before truly preparing a defense. Patent litigation can be “lethal” to small companies both logisti174
cally and financially. Defending a patent often requires hundreds to thousands of hours of additional work and may cost
175
more than $5 million. Therefore, when aimed at small businesses, privateering can be highly anticompetitive by (1) raising small rivals’ costs; (2) impeding small rivals’ ability to operate in or enter a market; and (3) foreclosing on competition in
innovation. These effects on small businesses significantly risk
their exclusion from the market—a result that is unlikely when
176
patent privateering is targeted at large competitors.
1. Raising Small Rivals’ Costs
First, when settlement terms are prohibitively expensive,
small businesses may be forced to increase prices, withdraw
from the market, or expend extremely limited resources on a
177
legal fight. Unlike larger companies with considerable reserves and/or cash flow, small companies are ill-equipped to
178
pay settlements or pursue expensive and lengthy litigation.
172. E.g., Duan, supra note 31; see Brief of Public Knowledge & the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra
note 57, at 17–18.
173. See Demand Letters—Senate, supra note 101, at 15 (statement of
Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer, Cisco Systems, Inc.); Sean Patrick Butler, Dealing with NPEs:
Views from a Startup GC, in NON-PRACTICING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION
2013, supra note 27, at 35–36; Mike Masnick, Patent Trolls Causing Serious
Problems for Startups, TECHDIRT (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20120915/01425620391/patent-trolls-causing-serious-problems
-startups.shtml (describing the emotional impact of PAE patent litigation).
174. The Patent Troll Problem, supra note 61.
175. Meaghan Hemmings Kent et al., 10 Reasons Every Defendant in Patent Litigation Should Consider Inter Partes Review, MONDAQ (Apr. 26, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309504/Patent/10+Reasons+Every+
Defendant+in+Patent+Litigation+Should+Consider+Inter+Partes+Review.
176. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10.
177. Indeed, one of the most common reasons a small business fails is insufficient capital, which may be siphoned away by legal fees. See Patricia
Schaeger, The Seven Pitfalls of Business Failure and How To Avoid Them,
http://www.businessknowhow.com/startup/business
BUSINESSKNOWHOW,
-failure.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
178. Duan, supra note 31 (“Big companies like Cisco have $13 million to
battle these tactics and obtain justice. Little startups, small businesses, and
solo entrepreneurs do not.”).
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In addition to the disproportionate ability of small businesses
to defend themselves, the legal costs to defend a suit can be
disproportionately greater for small businesses than for larger
179
companies as well. Even if the lawsuit shows only slight or
even no merit, it is usually cheaper for small businesses to set180
tle. Thus, it is no wonder that some commentators have
181
called patent litigation “the true sport of kings,” and PAE pa182
tent litigation against small companies “silent extortion.”
Since small businesses are more likely to settle patent in183
fringement lawsuits, they usually must pass on the cost of
184
any settlements to consumers. The increased costs of prod179. See Lloyd Dixon et al., The Impact of Regulation and Litigation on
Small Business and Entrepreneurship: An Overview 20 (Kauffman-RAND Ctr.
for the Study of Small Bus. and Reg., Working Paper No. 317-ICJ, 2006),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2006/RAND_
WR317.pdf; see also Brief of Public Knowledge & the Electronic Frontier
Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 57, at 17
(“[Small companies] are the ones least able to secure distant counsel, travel to
a distant forum, and learn the procedures of a new jurisdiction.”); Xun Liu,
Note, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions
Away from Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 494
(2013) (“[S]mall businesses suffer greater direct impact from patent lawsuits
because they pay more litigation costs relative to their size.”).
180. See Dixon et al., supra note 179, at 42; Chien, supra note 21, at 467–
68; Joff Wild, It Is Time To Talk About the Patent Ogres, IAM (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=dba41734-acfa-4759-93fc
-26fcb2c0b98a.
181. Hixon, supra note 4. Some have also described the situation faced by
privateer’s targets as “giv[ing] up their gold and treasure, walk[ing] the plank
or be[ing] put to the sword.” Tim Sparapani, Attack of the Patent Privateers,
FORBES (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/09/02/
attack-of-the-patent-privateers/#2f574bfe2184.
182. Paul Muschick, Feds Crack Down on Patent Trolling, MORNING CALL
(Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-patent-trolls-mphj
-watchdog-20141227-column.html (quoting Pennsylvania Attorney General
Kathleen Kane).
183. Again, this is primarily because small businesses are unwilling to
“walk . . . the plank and tak[e] their chances while their business is under attack.” Sparapani, supra note 181.
184. Indeed, most businesses find this is necessary unless they hold substantial reserves. See generally Raphael Auer & Thomas Chaney, Exchange
Rate Pass-Through in a Competitive Model of Pricing-to-Market, 41 J. MONEY
CREDIT & BANKING 151 (2009) (developing a model of pricing-to-market passthrough under perfect competition and flexible prices); Michael B. Devereaux
& James Yetman, Price Adjustment and Exchange Rate Pass-Through, 29 J.
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 181 (2010) (describing a theoretical model that would account for the determinants of exchange rate pass-through to consumer price);
Aaron Huff, Reality-Based Pricing, 166 COMM. CARRIER J. 26 (2009) (discussing how commercial carriers are using mapping software and GPS technology
to more efficiently track their mileage so as to keep down the cost pass-
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ucts and services offered by small rivals subsequently render
185
them less competitive than large sponsor companies. Further,
because small companies often settle in the face of threats of
PAE litigation, there is greater possibility that royalties in excess of the value of the patents allegedly infringed upon will be
186
gathered. This does not happen as often when larger compa187
nies are sued due to their willingness and ability to defend.
In fact, most large companies are not the targets of patent pri188
vateering in the first place.
Finally, some PAEs target whole swathes of small business
189
rivals at once. Sometimes small businesses ignore demand
190
letters, but many settle. Thus, as a group, hundreds to thousands of small businesses operating in an industry and competing with a more-dominant firm can suffer increased costs and
the host of other detrimental effects. Thus, patent privateering
can enable a large company to raise tens to hundreds of rivals’
costs very efficiently.

through); John B. Taylor, Low Inflation, Pass-Through, and the Pricing Power
of Firms, 44 EURO. ECON. REV. 1389 (2000) (arguing that the decline of passthrough is due to the low inflation environment that has recently been
achieved in many countries).
185. Cf. Jagmohan Raju & Z. John Zhang, Introduction to Smart Pricing:
How Google, Priceline, and Leading Businesses Use Pricing Innovation for
Profitability, FT PRESS (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article
.aspx?p=1569334&seqNum=2 (explaining competition-based pricing).
186. See Symposium, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 395
(2014). Some have attributed this to the nuisance or “holdup” value of a patent. See Chien, supra note 21, at 472–74; Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15,
at 2; see also Ewing, supra note 11, at 3 (stating that litigation tools such as
PAEs can extract greater value from patent rights).
187. See Richard Lloyd, Unwired Planet CEO Praises Judge’s Technical
Knowledge After Major UK Court Win Against Samsung and Huawei, IAM
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=232cb69d
-0343-4646-822c-c8b2a59066fc (reporting that Samsung and Huawei fought a
patent privateer sponsored by Ericsson).
188. E.g., supra note 171 and accompanying text.
189. E.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d
903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (stating that 8,000 demand letters were sent to small
businesses and end-users alleging patent infringement, but only twenty-six
were actually litigated, in this case); FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion
Entity from Using Deceptive Tactics, supra note 40 (stating that a PAE sent
out 4,800 demand letters, but none went to trial).
190. Chien, supra note 21, at 472 (stating that 22% of all companies do
nothing in response to a demand letter, 35% fought the demand in some way,
9% changed their products or business, 17% chose other actions, and 18% automatically settled).
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2. Impeding Small Rivals’ Ability To Operate in or Enter a
Market
Threats of litigation can also substantially impede a
startup’s ability to attract and keep customers and raise
191
funds. In 2012, 40% of PAE-targeted small companies reported a significant operational impact (such as a change in business, exit from the market, delay in milestone, change in product, etc.) as a result of a demand letter or an actual lawsuit
192
brought by a PAE. About 13% of these small and startup
companies exited their business or had to pivot their business
193
strategy, and about 4% suffered fundraising impact. When
small businesses are forced to change their offerings, raise
prices, or exit the markets, this affects consumers by reducing
choice and availability.
Patent litigation can also exacerbate barriers to entry for
small companies, reducing competition and raising the cost of
194
production. For example, a new entrant in an industry will
face greater startup costs if sued by multiple incumbents as
soon as entering. If an industry is known for such tactics, it is
195
usually less attractive to entrepreneurs and investors. In fact,
patent privateering is inversely related to venture capital in196
vestment. Large companies often do not need to worry about
197
fundraising activities with investors.

191. See Demand Letters—Senate, supra note 101, at 13 (statement of
Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, and Chief Compliance
Officer, Cisco Systems, Inc.); Sparapani, supra note 181 (“[Startups] may get
stabbed to death and choose to terminate their business entirely to end impoverishing litigation and avoid bogus infringement claims.”). For example, a
four-employee startup that held a highly-ranked app on iTunes was forced to
gut its app in response to a demand letter for royalties and removed features
that customers liked. Id. at 11. The app is no longer successful, and the company is failing. Id.
192. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10.
193. Id. at 11.
194. Reilly, supra note 20, at 79; Dixon et al., supra note 179, at 20.
195. See Chien, supra note 21, at 474–76.
196. Kiebzak et al., supra note 11 (stating that venture capital investment
would have been at least $8.1 billion higher over the course of a five year period but for frequent PAE litigation).
197. See Don Duffy, CEOs Need a “Healthy Paranoia” of Activist Investors,
CNBC (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/12/ceos-need-a-healthy
-paranoia-of-activist-investors-commentary.html (“The upsurge of shareholder
activist campaigns in recent years has been a hot topic for corporate America.”). Large companies are, however, subject to the opinions of investors in
terms of management, governance, and direction. See id.
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Threats of suit or actual litigation against small companies
can have the effect of scaring away customers, suppliers, and
other business partners, lowering stock prices and company
valuations, disrupting mergers and acquisitions, distracting
198
management, and prompting inefficient use of resources.
Business partners, when faced with the threat of litigation,
199
may even decide a joint venture’s costs outweigh the benefits.
A patent infringement lawsuit may also be asserted at extremely inopportune times in an attempt to head off a small ri200
val’s momentum. In a real life example affecting valuations, a
startup eyewear company named Ditto laid off four employees
to defend a patent lawsuit and was later valued $3–4 million
less than its pre-lawsuit valuation, hindering is ability to raise
201
funds and compete in the eyewear market.
3. Foreclosing on Competition in Innovation
Small businesses are more important innovators in the
U.S. economy than large companies, raising concerns about
202
Small
privateering’s effects on competition in innovation.
businesses generate more patents per employee than large
203
companies, employ a greater percentage of all scientists and
engineers (38% compared to 27% employed by large compa204
nies), and “a small firm patent is more likely than a large
198. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 23–24; Robert G. Eccles et al.,
Reputation and Its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2007), https://hbr.org/
2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks.
199. E.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced
Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 117–18 (2006); Jim Milliot, Startup
Denies Competition Charges, But Will Close, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Jan. 3,
2005),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/print/20050103/37732-startup
-denies-competition-charges-but-will-close.html.
200. A lawsuit could be asserted right before a small business makes an
initial public offering or starts offering a superior product in the marketplace.
201. Tucker, supra note 11, at 3.
202. See Lee-Makiyama, supra note 43 (noting that competition in innovation is not just a domestic concern, but also an international one as nations
begin to employ patent privateering).
203. See ANTHONY BREITZMAN & DIANA HICKS, AN ANALYSIS OF SMALL
BUSINESS PATENTS BY INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE, at iii (Nov. 2008),
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/rs335tot.pdf; U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ADVOCACY: THE VOICE OF SMALL BUSINESS
IN GOVERNMENT 3 (2012), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_
2012.pdf (stating that small businesses generate sixteen times more); Schmidt
et al., Why “Patent Reform” Harms Innovative Small Businesses,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/25/why
-patent-reform-harms-innovative-small-businesses/id= 4926 (five times more).
204. Schmidt et al., supra note 203.
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firm patent to be among the top 1% of most frequently cited pa205
tents.” Indeed, some commentators have stated that small
businesses “may well be most important to [the] economy as
agents of change signaled by the fact that the small firm contribution to innovation is most intense in leading edge technol206
ogies.”
Patent privateering is usually targeted at companies that
are involved in high-tech patents, affecting competition in are207
as of cutting-edge innovation. In addition, high-tech patents
tend to be more interchangeable and more likely to overlap,
meaning that it is more difficult for small businesses to assess
208
the validity of alleged infringement. Therefore, patent privateering against small businesses can disproportionately fore209
close competition in innovation. This results in a prolongation
of the technological status quo, which favors large incumbents
but harms consumers through the stagnation of useful arts and
sciences.

205. CHI RESEARCH, SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CONCHANGE 3 (Feb. 27, 2003), http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/
rs225tot.pdf.
206. Id. at 25; see also BREITZMAN & HICKS, supra note 203 (“[T]he patents
of small firms in general are likely to be more technologically important than
those of large firms.”).
207. See Chien, supra note 21, at 464 (stating that 60% of litigation demands involved software or high-tech patents). Because small businesses develop more high-tech patents, and high-tech patents tend to be used in lucrative industries, this may partially explain why PAEs target small businesses
more often than large companies. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 45, at 10.
208. Chien, supra note 31, at 1589; see also Economists’ Roundtable on Hot
Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16, at 18–19 (discussing the difficulty in assessing whether one’s products and services actually infringe on
technological patents); Ewing, supra note 11, at 30 (stating that privateering
is more prevalent in industries where patents are interchangeable because
this makes it easier for the privateer to assert infringement with some apparent validity); Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the
Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 17 (2014)
(stating that deference to settlements of patent infringement suits exists because they are “plagued with validity and boundary problems so severe that
judges cannot have a great deal of confidence in the courts”).
209. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 110, at 18–20; Chien, supra note
21, at 474; Kiebzak et al., supra note 11, at 220; Muschick, supra note 182. For
example, health IT companies have been found to cease all innovation in a
given technology while being sued for patent infringement by a PAE. EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45. Another example is X-Plane, a company sued by Google, which abandoned development of certain new products
altogether as a result of the lawsuit. Mullin, supra note 19.
TRIBUTION TO
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The above-mentioned effects can disproportionately foreclose competition by raising small rivals’ costs, forcing them to
exit the market, discouraging rivals from entering the market,
providing large sponsor companies with superior litigating positions, and reducing or foreclosing competition in innovation.
All of these effects are anticompetitive in its most basic concept
210
and consequently harm consumers and societal progress.
B. EXISTING COMMENTARY FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER
HOW PATENT PRIVATEERING AFFECTS SMALL BUSINESSES
Only a handful of commentators have addressed patent
privateering and the application of antitrust law, and there are
211
few cases even indirectly on point. Some commentators are
hopeful that antitrust law holds a solution to counter the worst
212
cases of patent privateering, but others disagree, concluding
that outside limited scenarios, antitrust laws are inapplicable
213
All past commentators appear to
to patent privateering.
agree that antitrust law probably cannot provide refuge from
privateering for all businesses, but none have considered how
small businesses are uniquely and disproportionately affected
by patent privateering.
This Section considers the viability of the antitrust counterclaims and defenses discussed in Part I.C, in the same order.
It closes by discussing the practical problem of concealed sponsor identity, which limits the availability of antitrust theories
to counter privateering.

210. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 186, at 494–95.
211. There is, however, a current English case, which will be the first to
consider “the phenomenon of patent privateering.” In Patent Portfolio Licenses, English Court Considers Patent Privateering and Gives Further Guidance
on FRAND Terms, 4-TRADERS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.4-traders.com/
HUAWEI-TECHNOLOGY-CO-LTD-7785078/news/In-patent-portfolio
-licences-English-Court-considers-patent-privateering-and-gives-further
-guidance-21540123. The court appears to plan to address the privateering issues in summer 2016. See id.
212. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 12; Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 446–47.
213. See Jurata & Patel, supra note 160, at 1265; Joshua D. Wright &
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A Competition
Cure for a Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 501, 516 (2014); Joshua D.
Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Dechert Client Annual
Antitrust Spring Seminar 10 (Apr. 17, 2013), Westlaw 1728229.
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1. Section 1 Claims
Section 1 claims involve contracts in restraint of trade be214
tween two or more competitors. When two competitors contract to jointly sponsor and control a PAE, such would likely vi215
olate Section 1 because it would be obviously anticompetitive.
However, as explained earlier, such an arrangement would be
extremely uncommon.
By contrast, a privateering arrangement might involve an
216
agreement between one sponsor and a privateered PAE. If
the sponsor and PAE have a licensing or similar agreement,
then a rule of reason analysis would be performed because
agreements of this type are not currently per se violations. But
because most privateering arrangements exist via transfers of
217
ownership, Section 1 claims probably fail because no contract
is involved.
Even if a privateering arrangement is memorialized in the
form of a license agreement, small business defendants may
face another potential problem: the fact that the sponsor company maintains an ownership stake in the PAE, meaning the
relationship could be a close one and not subject to Section 1 as
a result. This is because parent companies are not liable for anticompetitive arrangements with wholly-owned or substantial218
ly-controlled subsidiaries. Thus, this form of PAE sponsorship
is insulated from Section 1 claims.
Assuming this issue does not arise, though, a privateering
agreement’s effects would most likely be more anticompetitive
than pro-competitive when the privateering is directed against
small businesses, for the reasons put forth in Part II.A. However, this scenario is more susceptible to arguments for procompetitive benefits. For example, a PAE could be merely facilitating the assertion of patents in a more effective and efficient
way than the sponsor company could on its own, freeing the
219
sponsor to focus on other competitive activities such as R&D.
Given this benefit, commentators have argued that a court
214. See supra Part I.C.1.
215. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 12 (discussing how Nokia
and Microsoft pooled their patents and used one PAE to sue competitors);
Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 460–61 (discussing how competitors
may conspire to sue other competitors in the terms of a settlement).
216. See Jurata & Patel, supra note 160, at 1267.
217. See supra Part I.B.3.
218. MACAVOY, supra note 132.
219. See Jurata & Patel, supra note 160, at 1268.
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would likely not find that the agreement constitutes an unrea220
sonable restraint of trade. However, the same commentators
did not consider the unique ways in which patent privateering
disproportionately affects small businesses, and the unbalanced
221
effects stated in Part II.A are far from reasonable.
Except in the rare circumstance of co-sponsored patent privateering, Section 1 probably cannot readily provide a small
business defendant relief under the antitrust laws because it is
too easy for sponsors to create a privateering arrangement
without drafting an agreement. In fact, the evidence suggests
222
that this is already occurring.
2. Section 2 Claims
Unlike Section 1 claims, which apply to agreements in restraint of trade, Section 2 claims prohibit monopolization, at223
tempts to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize. Because
monopoly power is the ability “to foreclose competition, to gain
224
a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor,” the
analysis in Part II.A suggests that most instances of patent
privateering against small businesses have the effect of granting sponsors greater market power. Even when a sponsor targets hundreds to thousands of small competitors, it may be said
to obtain market power because its efforts could drive up costs
for all small rivals in the industry as well as increase prices for
consumers and reduce the availability of important goods and
225
Admittedly,
services from alternative, smaller businesses.
courts may not be willing to adopt such a sweeping understanding from the outset.
In theory, most instances of patent privateering against
small businesses are actionable under Section 2 if courts accept
the above argument. Some commentators anticipate this understanding, pointing out, however, that the link between raising rivals’ costs to maintenance or acquisition of monopoly
226
power must be strong. The analysis in Part II.A shows a siza-

220. Id.
221. See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice,
Address at the Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 8, 2013), Westlaw 6037326.
222. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 2.
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2014); supra Part I.C.2.
224. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 401.
225. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 81.
226. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 10–11; Popofsky & Laufert,
supra note 17, at 456.
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ble causal link, especially in view of the exacerbated effects patent privateering has on small businesses. If monopoly power
can be established, the traditional unilateral monopolization
claim proceeds to whether the patent privateering constitutes a
227
willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. Since
patent privateering is purposed on hindering rivals’ ability to
compete with the sponsor, the mere existence of the arrange228
ment should establish the requisite intent.
However, since monopoly power is always viewed in relation to the market a potential monopolist occupies, Section 2
229
claims must always be directed at sponsor companies. This is
because PAEs do not operate in a given market, so they cannot
be liable under Section 2 monopolization or attempts to monopolize. Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One illustrates this limi230
tation. In that case, Capital One counterclaimed Intellectual
231
Ventures I, the largest PAE in the world, under Section 2 of
232
the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Capital
233
One also asserted patent misuse as a defense. Both counterclaims and the misuse defense were dismissed, mostly due to
234
the PAE’s lack of market power in the relevant market. However, if Capital One would have been able to determine the
sponsor, a Section 2 claim should have been viable against that
sponsor, joined by counterclaim.
Given the detrimental impact patent privateering can have
on small businesses, a small business defendant should also be
able to successfully allege a sponsor’s dangerous possibility of
achieving monopoly power for attempted monopolization
235
claims. The extent of dangerousness may be debatable, depending on the size and market power of the sponsor company,
227. See supra Part I.C.2.
228. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993)
(suggesting that predatory litigation in this way could be sufficient to show
intent in monopolization claims).
229. See, e.g., PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 77 (“The alleged infringer would need to add the original patent holder as a counterclaim
defendant and establish . . . monopoly in the relevant market.”).
230. See Memorandum Opinion, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740-AJT-TCB (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013).
231. See Largest Patent Holdings, PATENTFREEDOM, https://www
.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/holdings (last visited Jan 3, 2015). Intellectual
Ventures has an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 U.S. patents. Id.
232. Memorandum Opinion, Intellectual Ventures I, slip op. at 4–9.
233. Id. at 9–10.
234. Id. at 11.
235. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 456.
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the characteristics of the market, and the strategy pursued; the
greater the market share and breadth of targeting, the more
dangerous the probability. Since it is unlikely that large sponsors would engage in patent privateering (as opposed to simply
suing in its own name) for non-competitive purposes, attempted
monopoly claims should be successful if asserted against the
sponsor. In instances of small companies using patent privateering against similarly-sized rivals, an attempted monopolization claim is more questionable, but still very possible.
Conspiracies to monopolize depend on similar factors as
Section 1 and Section 2 claims, and authority suggests that
such a claim may be asserted against any member of a conspir236
acy or all of them. This may be the best Section 2 claim if evidence suggests that the PAE is engaged in privateering, but the
sponsor is unknown and suspected to be a large market player.
Still, ascertaining the sponsor company’s identity will be necessary to prove the conspiracy. This practical difficulty seriously
limits the ability to assert a successful Section 2 counter237
claim.
3. Handgards Claims
Following the analysis above relating to Section 2 claims, a
small business defendant could also assert a Handgards counterclaim by arguing that the patents being asserted are invalid
238
or that the suit is objectively baseless. This strategy would
probably be most successful when the patent privateer asserts
infringement of many different patents, using its large patent
arsenal to artificially increase the size of the litigation threat,
when no legitimate infringement exists at all or is highly questionable. This kind of claim could be expensive to prove, however, because it requires the small business defendant to make
239
extensive legal arguments about the invalidity of the patents.
Sham litigation is also difficult to prove, and in high-tech
industries, it may be impossible. This is because patents tend
to be interchangeable and likely to overlap, making it difficult

236. See, e.g., United States v. Dunham Concrete Products, Inc., 501 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1974); Feld, supra note 142.
237. See supra Part I.C.3.
238. See supra Part I.D.3.
239. For example, the cost of simply engaging in inter partes review (an alternative way of challenging a patent’s validity once sued, which stays court
action when initiated) costs around $200,000 to $750,000. Kent et al., supra
note 175. Comparatively, defending a patent lawsuit costs millions. Id.
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to establish that litigation is being pursued without an objec240
tive basis or in bad faith. Combined with the fact that patents
241
enjoy a statutory presumption of validity, this makes a successful Handgards claim unlikely for most general cases of patent privateering.
Moreover, infringement actions of uncertain or dubious validity are protected conduct, even if the conduct has anticom242
petitive effects. Current Noerr-Pennington immunity protects
patent holders from antitrust liability so long as their patents
243
and lawsuits are not invalid or clearly meritless. This limitation applies to any antitrust theory. In In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, the court held that a PAE’s mass
threat of assertion against thousands of small businesses, and
eventual twenty-three lawsuits, was not objectively baseless
and could be asserted despite the possibility that the PAE’s
244
conduct had anticompetitive effects. Thus, so long as a privateered PAE asserts patents against small business defendants
with at least some validity, any Section 2 claim will probably
245
fail under this case’s precedent.
Some have argued that it should matter “little whether the
privateer’s case against the target is frivolous or has exception246
al merit.” Because the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was created
in a time before PAEs and patent privateering were commonplace, this argument has some persuasive weight. After all,
when developing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the courts did
not foresee or expect that the majority of patent litigation
would turn into a game of indirect, secretive petitioning activity. And while the policy arguments favor protecting the right
240. Indeed, in the Handgards case itself, the patents involved were used
in the manufacturing of plastic gloves and cannot fairly be described as hightech. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984).
However, sham litigation has been successfully shown in high-tech industries
such as pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Rochester Drug Co-op. v. Braintree Labs.,
712 F. Supp. 2d 308, 311–12 (D. Del. 2010).
241. See 35 U.S.C § 282 (2014).
242. E.g., Jurata & Patel, supra note 160, at 1276; Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 447.
243. Id.
244. 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
245. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 28 (“[I]t is extremely difficult
to establish that assertion of a patent against a product is a sham, particularly
given the high burden of proof that some courts have required in sham litigation cases. In sum, it is tremendously difficult to succeed in a private antitrust
claim.”).
246. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 80.
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for persons (whether natural or incorporeal) to petition the government, the antitrust implications seem to weigh heavily
against applying the same protections to covert operatives suing on sponsors’ behalf.
If indeed a PAE is engaging in patent privateering, there
should be no hesitation by a court to reject a Noerr-Pennington
immunity argument. Although this immunity has been tied to
whether a suit is meritless, the Handgards doctrine more
broadly concerns whether a claim was brought for the relief
sought, instead of primarily for the outcomes that result from
the judicial process (such as a rival’s exiting the market under
suit). Therefore, where patent privateering is employed against
a small competitor, the likely motivations and outcomes that
will result from such an action ought to in most cases overwhelmingly demand the conclusion that Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply. This reasoning comports with what
Handgards claims are designed to address: the use of litigation
as a weapon in a concealed attempt to interfere with a competi247
tor. Further, it ensures that courts, which are supposed to be
a “defense against organized bullying,” do not “become the tools
248
of organized bullying.”
In summary, a Section 2 claim, whether Handgards or not,
should be successful in theory if a sponsor’s identity is known
and the privateering relationship can be sufficiently pleaded.
4. Section 7 Claims
Some commentators suggest that the most “natural mechanism” to challenge patent privateering is Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which prohibits acquisitions that may substantial249
ly lessen competition or create a monopoly. They argue that
acquisitions of patents by privateered PAEs can harm competition by enhancing sponsors’ ability to “hinder or exclude rivals
and thereby gain incremental market power” in much the same
250
way as discussed in Parts II.A and II.B.1–3. Therefore, patent
acquisitions by privateered PAEs could substantially lessen
competition and may even create or maintain monopoly power
for the sponsor.
Other commentators dispute the anticompetitive effects of
patent transfers, arguing that patent litigation by privateered
247.
248.
249.
250.

See Schwarz et al., supra note 129.
Duan, supra note 31 (emphasis omitted).
Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 11.
See id.
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PAEs is no different than the exercise of the sponsor’s pre251
existing market power. However, as asserted in Parts I.B.4
and II.B.2, patent privateering offers sponsors considerable
benefits and negatively affects both targeted companies and
consumers. Privateering also forecloses competition from small
252
rivals in the market and in innovation. In addition, accumulation of patents by privateers and their covert nature incentivize infringement lawsuits implicating as many patents as possible. This approach to patent litigation renders a patent
lawsuit by a privateer more formidable than what could have
been brought by its sponsor—but also more likely to be considered sham.
Most commentators agree that acquisitions of patents by
PAEs would probably violate Section 7 if the PAE aggregates
all substitute patents for a certain kind of product or in a certain industry because this would enable a sponsor, through the
253
PAE, to obtain and maintain monopoly power. The court
found this in Kobe v. Dempsey Pump, in which Dempsey purchased key patents for hydraulic oil pumps, and no competitor
could make a product without infringing on at least one of the
254
patents. The court held that the underlying purpose of accumulating the patents was a violation of Section 7 and patent
255
misuse. Similar reasoning could equally apply to patent privateers, which acquire patents in this way, especially if small
businesses are targeted by privateers with comprehensive patent holdings.
Despite the likelihood of success in bringing these, there
are certain downfalls to them. For one, a patent privateering
256
relationship may not entail patent transfers or acquisitions.
In addition, even if a sponsored PAE did acquire patents, it
251. See Wright, supra note 213, at 8.
252. As added support, “[c]onduct that impairs the opportunities of rivals
and either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way may be deemed anticompetitive.” Rochester Drug Coop. v. Braintree Labs., 712 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (D. Del. 2010) (citing Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604–05 (1985)). Patent privateering appears to do this and more.
253. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 66, at 775; Jurata & Patel, supra note
160, at 1265; Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 452; see also Hesse, supra
note 221, at *9 (stating that there have been competitive concerns in this area,
and some experts have suggested challenges under Section 7).
254. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 140–41 (citing Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey
Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952)).
255. Id.; see supra Part I.B.2.
256. See supra Part I.B.3.
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might only acquire a specific set of patents needed to target a
rival, eliminating the possibility that the Kobe precedence
might apply. And furthermore, this claim suffers from the same
practical difficulties in asserting the claim successfully in court,
both in knowing enough about the relationship to meet pleading requirements and a small target’s likely inability to afford
257
to defend itself.
5. Patent Misuse Defenses
It is unclear whether patent misuse could successfully be
258
used to render a privateered patent unenforceable. This is
primarily because patent misuse only applies to specific exten259
sions of a patent’s grant of monopoly power, which is limited
to the exclusive right to make certain inventions and forbids
the use of the patent to “secure an exclusive right or limited
260
monopoly . . . contrary to public policy.” Usually, unlawful extensions of a patent grant involve attempting to merely enforce
the patent’s power beyond its terms.
However, to enable this defense in patent privateering scenarios, courts would need to accept the theory that privateered
patent litigation is itself somehow an unlawful extension of the
patent grant’s monopoly power. Arguably, patent privateering
extends the utility of one or more patents beyond its limited
scope by allowing sponsors to more effectively assert infringement of such patents than they could without the help of a
PAE. Because small businesses are especially likely to respond
to suits in ways that harm themselves and benefit large sponsors, patent privateers tend to be more effective at asserting
261
patents against small businesses than large sponsors. In this
way, the combination of the threat and the way the small business defendant will likely respond to it extends a patent’s power beyond its power to exclusively sell an invention. A patent
owner’s rights, by definition, include the right to threaten to
exclude others from practicing a patent, but patent privateering makes the threat of infringement unusually powerful—and
perhaps even more credible or seemingly more meritorious
than it actually is. This effect then enables the patent owner to
257. See infra Part II.B.6.
258. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 136–37.
259. Id. (citing Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2010)).
260. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
261. See supra Part II.A.
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secure a broader monopoly than is granted by the patent by its
terms; by excluding a rival, for example, a patent owner might
be able to secure monopoly over an entire industry or product
market, let alone the specific inventions claimed by the patent.
Jessica Rich, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, seems to endorse this understanding: “Patents can promote innovation, but a patent is not a license to engage in deception . . . . Small businesses . . . have the right to expect
262
truthful communications . . . .” Without transparency, patent
privateering may well be considered an unlawful extension of a
patent’s limited monopoly power and a predatory litigation tactic.
Assuming that a court might also accept this argument,
patent misuse will not protect a small business defendant from
future suit because it is only a defense. It might, however, force
the sponsor company to sue the small business in its own name
to cure the misuse resulting from covert enforcement. Thus, the
sponsor company would then be subject to the normal incentives and consequences of suing smaller rivals for patent infringement—a result that is overall better for society and more
in line with the goals of patent and antitrust law.
6. The Problem of Concealed Sponsor Identity
Despite the analyses above, which argue that some antitrust theories could be successful depending on the circumstances, it is unlikely that a small business defendant can ever
bring any of these theories. This is because the current patent
system precludes, in most circumstances, a small business defendant from acquiring specific or circumstantial knowledge of
263
Patent ownership, transfers,
a privateering arrangement.
264
and licensing agreements are usually secret. Since a small
business defendant may never know who is sponsoring a PAE
or if a PAE is sponsored at all, the small business defendant
will be unable to plead an antitrust counterclaim or defense in
265
the first place without being conclusory. This was, arguably,

262. FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion Entity from Using Deceptive
Tactics, supra note 40.
263. See, e.g., Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 12.
264. If the sponsor’s identity is not secret, and the privateering arrangement is known, then there is less need to use antitrust law to address the covert effects of patent privateering.
265. This problem is not unique to patent privateering; for example, in Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, a landmark Supreme Court decision, the plaintiffs suc-
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partially the problem in Intellectual Ventures. Further, this
inability may incentivize suits and make a market less attractive to potential new entrants, foreclosing future competition.
For Section 1 claims, this means that the small business
defendant will not know if there is an agreement between competitors or a sponsor and PAE. For Section 2 claims, the concealed identity of the sponsor presents similar difficulties, in
that a small business defendant will be unable to determine
which competitor is primarily benefiting from the suspected patent privateering arrangement. Likewise, for Section 7 claims,
a patent seller will be unknown, so that a claim against the indirectly benefiting sponsor-seller cannot be asserted. Similarly,
patent misuse defenses will be seen as merely speculative unless the small business defendant can pinpoint the sponsor
company. Lack of knowledge about the identity of a sponsor
eliminates the ability for defendants to retaliate with not only
patent infringement claims, but also other types of claims as
well, including those grounded in antitrust law.
There are further practical difficulties in determining the
identity of a sponsor. First, ownership is not required in order
267
to establish a privateering arrangement. Second, PAEs may
be established in venues with inhospitable piercing law, mak268
ing it harder to pierce a corporate veil and identify a sponsor.
Third, many PAEs create further shell companies to assert pa269
tents, which would complicate veil piercing. These layers also
increase the likelihood a PAE and its sponsor remain anonymous in future suits, even if one of their many shell companies’
veils are pierced and disclosed at trial.
Even if a small business defendant does have knowledge of
a privateering relationship and could successfully assert an antitrust counterclaim, small businesses must still choose to do
so. The analysis in Part II.A shows that most small businesses
cannot litigate in the first place, finding it both necessary and
prudent to settle due to their limited operational and financial
cumbed to a similar limitation, resulting in the dismissal of their case. 550
U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
266. Memorandum Opinion, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One
Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740-AJT-TCB, slip op. at 4–9 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18,
2013).
267. See supra Part I.B.3.
268. PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 77.
269. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 186, at 476. For example, Intellectual Ventures reportedly has more than 1,300 shell corporations with which to
litigate patents, potentially in multiple layers. Id.
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means. PAE defenders have argued that this effect of PAE patent litigation is a USPTO and litigation problem, not an anti270
trust one. While the way that small businesses respond to
privateered litigation threats may be a symptom of litigation,
the purposes of the privateering arrangement are of the kind
271
antitrust law is designed to prevent.
In summary, commentators have considered antitrust law
as a potential solution to address patent privateering against
all businesses. As a result, most agree that current antitrust
law might only stop patent privateering in rare circumstances—perhaps when small businesses are targets. In addition,
the analysis above shows that there are several practical reasons for why, even if theoretically antitrust law is a solution,
such claims and defenses would likely fail to make it past the
pleading stage of litigation. Technicalities and NoerrPennington immunity may also restrict the ability for current
antitrust law to bar patent privateering outright. And even if
antitrust law may theoretically already provide a solution for
small businesses sued by patent privateers, the realities of the
situation make it either too difficult or too costly to pursue the
solution. Part III provides a solution to all these problems.
III. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS PROVIDE A
SOLUTION
In the past several years, little has been done to address
patent privateering. This Part provides a comprehensive solution to the anticompetitive effects of patent privateering
against small businesses—the only kind of businesses substantially affected by privateering’s patent litigation activities. Section A showcases this solution in the form of rebuttable pre270. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 525.
271. See supra Part I.C, which notes that the goals of antitrust law are to
promote and protect fair competition. As Senator Sherman, the namesake of
the Sherman Act, once famously stated:
If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure
a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor we should not
submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and
to fix the prices of any commodity.
BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS: FIFTIETH CONGRESS
TO FIFTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS 95 (James A. Finch ed., 1902), https://play
.google.com/store/books/details?id=OsssAAAAYAAJ&rdid=book-OsssAAAAYA
AJ&rdot=1. Patent privateering, if left unchecked, would enable such a king or
emperor within a specific industry, without requiring it to compete for its
throne.
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sumption to be applied by courts. Section B compares this solution to other proposals recommended by scholars and reasons
that only the solution proposed in Section A can adequately address the patent privateering. Lastly, Section C addresses the
policy implications of the solution proposed in Section A in the
realms of antitrust law, patent law, and Noerr-Pennington immunity.
A. THE PROPOSAL FOR A SECTION 2 ANTITRUST VIOLATION
PRESUMPTION
As the analysis of Section 2 antitrust liability in Parts
II.B.2–3 shows, in most cases patent privateering against small
businesses constitutes an antitrust violation. Other kinds of antitrust liability are less likely to be successful and more attenuated. Section 2 antitrust liability can address every patent pri272
Therefore, a presumption of
vateering activity, however.
Section 2 liability would provide the most protection without
establishing a potentially too-sweeping presumption (say, of
any kind of Sherman or Clayton Act liability).
Because patent privateering has significantly anticompetitive effects when targeted against small businesses (but not
when against large ones), a rebuttable presumption of antitrust
liability must be carefully tailored to protect small businesses.
In contexts involving patent privateering against a small business, proving circumstantial anticompetitive effects should not
be a major difficulty since, on the whole, the analysis in Part
II.A indicates that patent privateering as a nationwide practice
harms competition and consumers. However, the ability to
prove that a privateering relationship exists is a formidable
273
hurdle. What is needed is a presumption structured in such a
way to remove this hurdle, while also allowing for the assertion
of good faith patent litigation suits; the presumption should not

272. Section 1 claims are restricted because they only apply to agreements,
trusts, and other combinations, which can easily be circumvented by transfers
of patents. Applying the presumption to Section 7 claims could also presume
too much; not every transfer of patents to a PAE leads to patent privateering.
Patent misuse does not provide small business defendants with more than
temporary relief—though the relief would entail elimination of the privateering arrangement. But since patent misuse is a defense, it has no teeth, unlike
Section 1, 2, and 7 claims. Further, its doctrinal foundation is already questioned. Section 2 is therefore best because it has a statutory foundation and
provides greater disincentives to sponsors to litigate against small businesses
through PAEs; violators would be subject to treble damages.
273. See supra Part II.B.6.
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be overly broad, nor should it be too narrow. Therefore, a solution must presume that any circumstances suggesting a strong
likelihood of patent privateering against a small business is un274
lawful as a violation of Section 2.
Courts, legislatures, and/or regulators should adopt a rebuttable presumption that a patent infringement lawsuit violates Section 2 as either monopolization, an attempt to monopolize or maintain monopoly power, or a conspiracy to monopolize
or maintain monopoly power in circumstances that are all but
certain to indicate a privateering relationship. This presumption would only apply when small businesses are being sued by
a PAE, which does not practice the patents in suit. Small businesses could be defined according to the Small Business Asso275
ciation’s size standards, per industry. In cases against these
so-defined small businesses, the likelihood of patent privateering and the risk of harm to competition is great enough to justify this presumption.
However, a PAE plaintiff should be allowed and entitled to
show that it is not a patent privateer. By providing easy-toobtain, basic factual evidence, good faith plaintiffs should be
able to rebut this presumption with only a slight burden. Ideally, rebutting evidence should relate to indicia of nonprivateering relationships. For example, a plaintiff could show
one of two “outs”: either that (1) the plaintiff is not a PAE, or
(2) the plaintiff is a PAE, but has no material ties to a competitor with monopoly power or close to market power in the market for the patent(s) being asserted. A PAE would be defined as
any person who is not an original inventor, a company that
substantially practices the patent, a university, or a technology
274. A presumption of unlawfulness need not be exclusive to Section 2. Any
number of business torts or consumer protection regimes may also be viable
alternatives. This Note, however, considers only antitrust law due to the powerful anticompetitive effects in play and the danger of monopolization. Both of
these negative effects are primarily addressed by antitrust law—though, other
doctrines may also be applicable.
275. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N, TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS MATCHED TO NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
CODES (2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_
Table.pdf. This per-industry classification takes into account the relative size
of an industry and its market participants. A small business could also be defined as any business with less than $100M in revenue each year. Chien, supra note 21, at 464, 475, showed that companies making less than $100M per
year constituted the majority of defendants in PAE patent infringement lawsuits. Firms making more than $100M per year were also less affected by such
lawsuits. Id. Therefore, the small businesses affected most by patent privateering probably make less than $100M in revenue per year.
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transfer organization solely purposed on commercializing tech276
nology developed by institutions of higher education. In regard to the second out, most non-PAE operating companies
could easily prove that they substantially practice their patents, so this presumption would have a de minimis effect on
them. Additionally, a presumption structured with these outs
would not prevent universities from protecting their patent
rights or the patent rights of their researchers. Lastly, inventors would be protected due to their non-inclusion as PAEs or
outsourcing to technology transfer organizations. These kinds
of PAE sponsors would have no competitive reason for refusing
to disclose their identity. It may even be to the PAE’s advantage to make such disclosure, as the sponsor’s identity may
engender sympathy or respect from fact-finders.
If, however, the plaintiff is a PAE (the first out), it would
have to prove that it has no ties to any competitors—especially
large competitors—with market power or dangerously close to
market power in the market for the patent(s) being asserted.
Such evidence would be harder to provide, but not unduly burdensome. This would require the PAE plaintiff to prove by clear
277
and convincing evidence that (1) there is no dominant (or
278
close to dominant) competitor practicing the patent, whether
licensed to or from, and (2) there is no formal or informal
agreement or arrangement in which any third parties to the
lawsuit have any form of economic or non-economic interest in
the outcome of the infringement lawsuit or use of the patents
being asserted, including subsidiary, intermediary, and ulti279
mate owners, of any percentage, of the PAE, itself. Framing
the exclusion this broadly would ensure that no conceivable
form of privateering relationship exists between the PAE and
any dominant (or near dominant) competitors in the market. If
276. This list is borrowed from the SHIELD Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. § 2
(b), (d) (2013).
277. This standard was chosen due to the harmful effects of patent privateering against small businesses and the need to provide small business defendants with hope that the rebuttable presumption may save them from legal
costs. Courts may find, however, that the preponderance of the evidence
standard is more appropriate, given the potential First Amendment implications.
278. A large competitor would be whatever is not a small competitor (those
companies making over $100M per year).
279. Essentially, this provision relates to the various ways in which a privateering relationship may be structured, in order to preclude any possible
formal privateering arrangement from rebutting the presumption. See supra
Part I.B.3 for an overview of these possible arrangements.
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there is no such relationship, then antitrust concerns are alleviated, and the suit is likely one brought by a non-privateered
PAE.
Lastly, the presumption should be rebutted in the event
that Section 2 liability can be otherwise disclaimed or disproven by the PAE-plaintiff.
If enforced, this rebuttable presumption would prevent patent privateers from suing small businesses for patent infringement and force dominant or nearly dominant sponsors to
sue in their own names instead. As a result, the incentives and
consequences of traditional patent litigation would inure to
both plaintiffs and defendants. The anticompetitive effects of
patent privateering would be lifted or at least extremely limited. In addition, the frequency of patent litigation would likely
decrease, as large sponsors would no longer be able to avoid the
various costs to them that are otherwise avoided through patent privateering. This would likely have public benefits, such
as reducing the burden and congestion on the public court system and increasing consumer and business faith in the justice
system as a whole.
B. A PRESUMPTION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OTHER
PROPOSALS
The presumption sketched out in Section A is likely to be
more effective than other solutions currently proposed. Recall
that most commentators have proposed changes to the patent
280
system in order to address patent privateering. One set of
proposals in this area requires parties to a patent infringement
lawsuit to list all persons with an interest in the outcome of the
281
case. This, the proponents argue, would help alleviate the
problem of concealed sponsors by providing defendants with at
least some circumstantial evidence of a possible privateering
relationship. However, these reforms would have to be worded
to account for both ownership and licensing interests to capture
the full range of formal patent privateering arrangements,
282
ownership, license, or otherwise. The presumption envisioned
280. See supra Part I.B.5.
281. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 120–21; O’Toole, supra note 27, at 70–72
(citing H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2014) and S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2014)) (discussing the America Invents Act).
282. The White House lists real party in interest disclosures as a top priority for future PAE legislation. FACT SHEET: White House Task Force on HighTech Patent Issues, WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
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above does this; and while such language could be adopted to
provide for this solution, a disclosure mechanism would still
present likely difficulties that are not encountered with a presumption.
For one, the timing of such disclosures would have to be
early, so that small business defendants could quickly assess
whether to defend or not. Timing of other important early disclosures, such as claim construction in Markman hearings, continues to be subject to judicial discretion and great variabil283
ity. Further, the creation of a disclosure requirement, even if
properly timed, would also require the courts to recognize the
antitrust liability arguments proposed in Part II.A, which underlie the presumption formulated above in Section A. Therefore, a disclosure requirement would require more moving parts
than a presumption.
Lastly, a disclosure requirement would likely not have the
same preclusive and deterrent effect of a presumption. A patent
privateer might still sue a small business target hoping the
target will respond in a way desirable to the privateer’s spon284
sor. The privateer could take this chance and may never need
to disclose its identity at all. With the proposed presumption,
the privateer would bear the initial onus to prove its nonanticompetitive nature to the court before proceeding against
285
the small business target. Until proven, a small business
would not have much risk and may even respond to see whether the good faith nature of the suit is proven. Due to the ways
in which small businesses respond to threats of patent litiga286
tion, this early burden-switch is desirable and necessary to
prevent patent privateering and its effects. A disclosure requirement would not accomplish such a goal.
Other reforms, most notably the SHIELD Act, aim to counteract the incentives for PAEs to litigate by imposing fee-

the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent
-issues.
283. See James P. Flynn, Markman: Courts Continue To Differ over Timing
of Claims Construction, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www
.ebglaw.com/news/markman-courts-continue-to-differ-over-timing-of-claims
-construction.
284. See supra Part II.A.
285. It may even face sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 if it cannot prove
this right away—an adequate deterrent.
286. They usually respond in ways that are anticompetitive and enable
monopoly for large sponsors. See supra Part II.A.
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287

shifting mechanisms. However, these reforms cannot fully
offset the competitive advantages of patent privateering when
unleashed against small businesses because most small rivals
288
will choose to settle before even defending themselves. If the
analysis in Part II is sound, small businesses should choose not
to settle; antitrust law already provides for treble damages, fee289
shifting, and criminal liability. But the evidence shows the
opposite. Therefore, a proposal like the SHIELD Act would likely have no practical effect on the incidence of patent privateering. Even if it provided another avenue of recovering costs,
small businesses are unlikely to be willing to front the bill for
potentially several years of litigation.
Lastly, a blanket prohibition against the use of PAEs in
290
patent litigation would probably not curb patent privateering.
First, it would be difficult for courts to determine if a company
truly is a PAE or not, given the secretiveness of privateering
arrangements. A court could employ the same criteria as listed
in the proposed presumption in Section A, but if it did so, it
might as well simply employ the presumption anyway. Second,
benign uses of PAEs for litigation by inventors, universities,
291
and small firms would be unjustifiably enjoined. A blanket
prohibition on privateering would thus be overly broad. Third,
prohibition would still not solve the evidentiary difficulty of
discovering the existence of a privateering arrangement or the
292
identity of a sponsor. Fourth, such a prohibition may violate
Noerr-Pennington immunity, established by the First Amendment. A presumption, on the other hand, succumbs to none of
293
these difficulties.

287. See H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th
-congress/house-bill/845/text (providing fees for a defendant who prevails in a
patent infringement lawsuit).
288. See Chien, supra note 21, at 485 (“[O]ne problem with a number of
these reforms is that they don’t directly or necessarily help those against
whom litigation is threatened, but not brought.”).
289. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
290. Cf. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 505–06 (noting Professor
Tim Wu’s proposal to exterminate all PAEs).
291. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Address at the Hearing on Digital Economy Oversight of Innovation Catalysts of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development 4 (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/
49623337.pdf.
292. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 80.
293. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of the First Amendment issue.
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A rebuttable presumption is not an uncommon mechanism
294
in antitrust law. Therefore, it is more likely that courts or
legislative bodies would be comfortable in employing such a
tool. Federal courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption in
295
at least one instance involving patent litigation already. Given the precedents already set by the federal courts and the fact
that this solution would likely be most effective at deterring patent privateering, it should be adopted.
C. POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to comparing the presumption laid out in Section A to other proposals, there are several policy considerations that must be made. This Subsection explores two primary
policy considerations: (1) the policies underlying both antitrust
and patent law, and (2) First Amendment, Noerr-Pennington
protections.
1. Antitrust and Patent Law
Recall that antitrust law is purposed on prohibiting competitor conduct that unjustifiably forecloses and harms con296
sumers. One way in which antitrust accomplishes this is by
prohibiting monopolies. Recall also that patent law is purposed
on promoting innovation by enticing inventors with the ability
297
to hold a limited monopoly over the use of their inventions.
Patent law, too, encourages healthy competition by incentivizing competitors to constantly invent new innovations that are
useful to society.
A presumption in favor of antitrust liability when a patent
monopoly is used to attain monopolies outside of the patent
grant and injure rivals is supported by both antitrust and patent law policy. It is easy enough to see why antitrust law
would favor this presumption given the harmful effects that
298
flow from patent privateering. Indeed, foreign regulators al294. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 14–17; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of
Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069 (2004)
(calling for a rebuttable presumption of illegality for patent settlements involving reverse payments).
295. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997).
296. See supra Part I.C; see also supra note 271.
297. See supra Part I.A.
298. See supra Part II.A.2.
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ready recognize this fact; the Korea Fair Trade Commission
(KFTC), for example, recently established that patent priva299
teering is “abusive or unreasonable.” The presumption envisioned in Section A would comport with this policy and with the
public policy of the antitrust laws: to ensure fair competition
between all businesses—not competition based on intimidation
and availability of financial resources for litigation.
Antitrust and patent policy further favors stopping destructive patent privateering against small businesses because
small businesses serve extremely important roles in the U.S.
300
economy and innovation. Disincentivizing covert patent litigation against small businesses also comports with the public
301
goal to “foster . . . small business growth and development.”
Although it would appear that a patent holder’s rights to
exclude others from using an invention through litigation could
be inhibited by the presumption advanced in Section A, the opposite is true. Rather, the presumption set forth in Section A
only prevents a large sponsor from using PAEs to litigate patent rights without a public connection to the sponsor.
Preventing patent privateering would also not detract from
the incentive that a patent monopoly provides inventors, unless
those inventors are incentivized to apply for patents in order to
covertly wield a club over a rival’s head in the hopes of excluding them from the market over the long-term. Certainly, such a
“right” was not intended to be part of the incentive for an inventor. Given that patent law intends to promote progress
through incentives and competition, the incentives cannot logically include such anti-competitive and regressive ends. The
rebuttable presumption proposed in Section A would thus eliminate the incentive to use a patent in a way that expands beyond the rights of a patent’s limited monopoly.
2. First Amendment
Recall that Noerr-Pennington immunity provides that persons may petition the government through litigation and that

299. Bart Eppenauer, Emerging Antitrust Regulation of Intellectual Property Licensing in Asia, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog
.com/2015/08/16/emerging-antitrust-regulation-of-intellectual-property
-licensing-in-asia/id=60693 (noting that both China and Korea have attempted
to preempt patent privateering and similar activity already seen in the U.S.,
but not yet prevalent in Asia).
300. See Liu, supra note 179, at 499–500.
301. Id. at 500.
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302

the First Amendment protects this activity. However, as has
been established in the Handgards cases, no person may petition the government in meritless ways as a strategy to harm
303
competitors and consumers. Usually, this is found when a
lawsuit is focused not on the outcome of the case on the merits,
but instead on the anticompetitive results of the judicial process (sham litigation).
The presumption in Section A may be said to stand as a
bar—albeit an extremely small one—to petitioning the government. However, it should be thought of as barring secretive and
vindictive petitioning conduct. The presumption’s narrow tailoring only applies to manners of speech (patent privateering)
that significantly bear on important societal and governmental
interests. As the Supreme Court has consistently stated, the
right to freedom of speech (and any constitutional right) is not
absolute; for example, restrictions have been justified in commercial speech cases where, generally speaking, restrictions
are content neutral, narrowly tailored, serve significant governmental interests, and leave room for alternative channels of
304
communication. The Handgards cases and Noerr-Pennington
doctrine reflects this same understanding by prohibiting meritless litigation.
The proposed presumption would survive a First Amendment challenge because it is content neutral, narrowly tailored
to patent privateering against small competitors (which has
been shown to be very anti-competitive), imposes a minimal
burden, serves the interests of promoting and protecting fair
competition and consumers, and does not affect the ability of
large sponsors to sue small rivals for patent infringement in
their own name (an alternative). And since covert patent privateering can only have anticompetitive purposes underlying it, it
is a sham and thus a recognized and appropriate exception to
Noerr-Pennington immunity.

302. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 138–40 (1961); Ewing, supra note 15, at 139; Roszkowski & Brubaker, supra note 147, at 416.
303. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979);
see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380
(1991).
304. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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CONCLUSION
Policy-makers have become increasingly wary of PAE patent acquisition and assertion activities. Through licensing or
transfers of patents, sponsor companies can direct—or privateer—PAEs to sue competitors for patent infringement in an
effort to raise rivals’ costs, hinder rivals’ ability to compete, and
forestall and foreclose competition from existing and potential
rivals. These anticompetitive effects inflate sponsor companies’
market power, at the expense of competition, regulation, innovation, and consumer welfare. When patent privateering is targeted against small businesses, these effects are exacerbated.
Small rivals are uniquely and disproportionately affected by
patent privateering and are more likely to succumb to its anticompetitive effects.
Most solutions proposed to address this problem involve increasing transparency, cost-shifting or sanctioning, and lifting
or piercing the corporate veil concealing a sponsor company’s
identity. There are ways for sponsors to circumvent these reforms, however, and disclosure mechanisms do not adequately
address mismatched incentives and privateering behavior.
Cost-shifting and blanket prohibitions succumb to similar
weaknesses. This Note proposes an alternative solution, in the
form of a rebuttable presumption of Section 2 antitrust liability. This presumption would operate when small businesses are
sued by PAEs for patent infringement and would deter patent
privateering against small businesses. As a result, large competitors could no longer employ covert patent litigation as a
way to foreclose competition among small rivals and new innovators in the marketplace, thus protecting and promoting a
competitive American economy.

